Russia-China energy ties have strengthened since the 2022 Ukraine war, with China increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas and Moscow and Beijing signaling closer cooperation in the months around the conflict’s outbreak.
Energy and trade between the two countries are expected to be central when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing; the meeting will likely cover pipeline deals, LNG and seaborne oil shipments, and the broader Russia-China relationship that is reshaping global markets for Russia China energy ties (sources: China General Administration of Customs; Gazprom; Transneft).
Below are key facts and figures about the energy ties between the two countries — covering gas pipelines, LNG, oil flows, pipeline construction, and the implications for supply, prices, and strategic diversification.
GAS
Russia’s gas giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through the 3,000-km (1,865-mile) Power of Siberia pipeline, a 30-year deal launched at the end of 2019 that underpins growing Russia-China energy cooperation (contract terms and launch details: Gazprom/Chinese partners).
Flows on the route rose sharply in 2025 to about 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) — roughly a 25% increase year-on-year — slightly exceeding the pipeline’s planned annual capacity of 38 bcm (source: Gazprom / Chinese customs data).
During President Putin’s visit to China in September (date), Moscow and Beijing agreed to raise annual shipments on Power of Siberia by an additional 6 bcm to around 44 bcm a year, reflecting both rising Chinese demand and Russia’s strategy to redirect volumes from European markets (official joint statements).
Separately, in February 2022, China agreed to take up to 10 bcm a year via a pipeline from Sakhalin Island by 2027; the two countries later discussed increasing that volume to 12 bcm (Rosneft/Government announcements). These additional gas pipeline links boost China’s supply diversity while securing Russian export volumes.
Despite these gains, Russia’s gas exports to China remain a fraction of the 177 bcm it supplied to Europe at the 2018–19 peak (IEA/historical trade data), underscoring the scale of the market shift required for China to fully replace European offtake.
Russia’s share of EU pipeline gas imports has fallen since the Ukraine war began, while Russia remained the EU’s second-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) last year with about a 16% share—though the United States widened its lead as the EU’s main LNG partner (Eurostat / IEA LNG stats).
Discussions are ongoing about a Power of Siberia 2 project — a proposed trans-Mongolian gas pipeline that could deliver up to 50 bcm per year from western Siberia to China. Gazprom began feasibility work on PoS2 in 2020, and the pipeline has gained urgency as Russia looks to shift gas volumes eastward (Gazprom / Mongolian government comments).
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that Moscow and Beijing signed a “legally binding memorandum” on PoS2, though a final, firm contract and financing details remain unresolved—a key watchpoint for construction timelines and capacity projections (Gazprom statement).
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) complements piped volumes: Russia’s seaborne LNG deliveries to China rose about 18.2% last year to roughly 9.79 million metric tons, according to China customs data cited by TASS — making Russia the third-largest LNG supplier to China after Australia and Qatar (China customs / TASS).
How China uses this gas: rising imports feed power generation, industrial heating, and feedstock for chemical production, helping meet the country’s needs as domestic production and coal-fired supply face transitions and decarbonization pressures (analysis: IEA / Chinese energy ministry reports).
Quick fact summary (key gas numbers): Power of Siberia capacity ~38 bcm (planned), 2025 flows ~38.8 bcm (actual), agreed increase to ~44 bcm, PoS2 proposed capacity 50 bcm, Sakhalin pipeline target 10–12 bcm, and Russia LNG to China ~9.79 million tons (last year).
OIL
China is Moscow’s largest client for seaborne and pipelined oil, and exports to China have remained elevated amid Western sanctions related to the Ukraine war — a dynamic that has reshaped Russia-China oil trade and global market flows.
According to China’s General Administration of Customs, China imported about 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian crude in 2025 (roughly 100.72 million metric tons), a 7.1% decline year-on-year; that volume accounted for about 20% of China’s total oil imports by volume (China GAC).
Russia’s exports to China accelerated again in early 2026: Yury Ushakov, President Putin’s foreign policy aide, said Russian oil shipments to China rose 35% in Q1 2026 to about 31 million tons—a sharp year‑on‑year increase that reflects both trading strategies and price dynamics after sanctions (Ushakov / Kremlin briefing).
China primarily receives Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude via the Skovorodino–Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian fields to Chinese refineries and to the Russian Far East export port of Kozmino. ESPO flows are a central part of Moscow’s strategy to keep oil moving to Asian markets (Transneft / pipeline operator data).
Transneft has announced plans to expand ESPO throughput to sustain exports via Kozmino and aims to complete works by 2029; in July 2025, the operator said ESPO Blend availability had been increased to about 1 million bpd, and exports via Kozmino have remained near that level (Transneft statements).
China also takes oil from Sakhalin Island—notably Sakhalin Blend and Sokol grades—delivered by tanker and pipeline links, providing additional seaborne supply to meet refinery demand (Sakhalin operators/customs data).
Beyond ESPO, Russia has agreed to boost shipments to China via Kazakhstan on the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year, raising annual capacity to 12.5 million tons — part of a broader push to diversify export routes and maintain volumes to Asian markets (Kazakh / Russian pipeline operator announcements).
Why volumes matter: Discounted Russian crude prices since the imposition of sanctions have made some grades competitive for Chinese refiners, supporting higher import levels even as overall global trade patterns shift. That price arbitrage has helped Russia keep export volumes flowing despite restrictions from Western markets (market analysis: Platts/Argus).
Quick oil trade snapshot (key numbers): 2025 Russian crude to China ~2.01 million bpd (~100.72 mt), Q1 2026 shipments ~31 million tons (reported 35% increase), ESPO pipeline length ~4,070 km, ESPO expanded flows ~1 million bpd since July 2025, Atasu‑Alashankou increased to ~12.5 mt/yr.
Conclusion: Strategic implications of Russia‑China energy ties
Executive summary: The strengthening Russia‑China energy relationship is reshaping global energy trade and security. Increased gas and oil flows to China — via pipelines such as Power of Siberia and ESPO, new Sakhalin and Kazakhstan routes, and rising LNG shipments — help Moscow offset lost European demand and boost Beijing’s supply diversification and energy security. These shifts affect prices, trading patterns and the role of companies and infrastructure in an environment shaped by sanctions and geopolitical realignment (sources: Gazprom, Transneft, China GAC, IEA).
Key takeaways:
- Market reshuffle: Russia’s pivot to Asia is materially changing oil and gas trade flows, altering price dynamics and supply links in global markets.
- Sanctions and trade response: Western sanctions have pushed Russia to deepen cooperation with China, with trade and energy ties helping sustain export volumes even as dependence on traditional European markets falls.
- Infrastructure and companies: Pipeline construction, ramped ESPO and Kozmino capacity, LNG terminals and state-linked companies (Gazprom, Transneft, Rosneft, and Chinese trading partners) are central to execution and strategy.
- China’s supply strategy: Beijing gains diversification — a combination of imports (piped and seaborne), possible increases in domestic production, and more flexible procurement approaches to meet industrial and power sector needs.
What to watch (near term):
- Power of Siberia 2: any move from a memorandum to a firm contract and financing — this determines whether a 50 bcm trans‑Mongolian pipeline is feasible.
- Transneft expansion milestones and Kozmino throughput targets toward the 2029 timetable.
- China import trends (monthly customs data) and LNG spot price movements that affect seaborne flows.
- Price spreads and arbitrage between discounted Russian grades and other sources — a driver of refinery buying decisions in Asia.
Implications for policy and markets: Continued growth in Russia-China energy ties increases Asia’s leverage in global oil and gas demand, reduces Russia’s dependence on European markets, and tests the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool to constrain exports. Companies and governments must weigh supply security, diversification, and the long‑term strategy for energy transition while monitoring project construction and contractual commitments.
Recommended next steps / further reading: Track primary data sources for real‑time verification: China General Administration of Customs (monthly import data), Gazprom and Transneft press releases (project and contract updates), and IEA/OECD analytical briefs for market impacts. For deeper analysis, consult market providers (Platts, Argus) and specialist reporting on sanctions, shipping, and trading flows.
Call to action: Subscribe to regular updates or follow the cited sources to watch how pipeline construction, company agreements, and shifting trade volumes shape supply, prices, and the broader Russia-China relationship in energy markets.
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